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THE IMPACT OF EU OVERSIGHT ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE GERMAN
AUTO INDUSTRY
Jason Gorn
INTRODUCTION

As the E uropea n Union (E .o.) ma rks its 50th anniversary, its effo rts to create a single
European free m arket continu e to face a number of o bstacles. A key business poli cy concern
among E. o. m ember states and corp orati ons is the E .o. policy directi ve that aims to
£lCilitate corpo rate takeovers in the interest of E uro p ean corpora te effi ciency in the glo bal
m arket place. As the E uropean Unio n stru ggles to establish economic regulato ry command
through m easures such as its directive on takeover bids, m ember nations and corporatio ns
com e under pressure to adhere to E. U . prescribed E u ropean practices rather than following
o nl y their own p erceived natio nal and corp o rate self-interest. Germ any, in particular,
provides a special challenge to E. 0. oversight as the result of an o ngoing debate o n
internatio nal corporate governance policies . A number of Germ an laws and business
practices conflict with E. U . poli cies. German corporatio ns rely o n concentrated corp orate
ownership and control to protect corpo rate stability. Alteratio ns to Germ an policies and
corp o rate governance stru ctu res that protect German corp orate ownership are a threat to
Germany's control over its industries, o pening the door to hostile takeovers of Ge rman
corporatio ns. Such policy alterati ons, ad vocated by the E.o. , test the resilien cy of the E. U.
and Germany's con111utment to the E. U .
Germany's stro ngest and m ost protected industry, the auto m obile industr y, provides
the best example of the challenges that face the German co rpo ra te system under E .U.
gove rnance. T h e current debate over Porsche's bid to control Volkswagen has op ened a
" Pando ra 's box of gover nance issues." I Ge rman state and corpo rate p olicies have lo ng been
geared toward protecting the G erman autom obile industry from perceived disruptive fo rces,
parti cularly corporate takeovers that might result in fo reign ow nership o r m aj o r
consolidatio ns of Ge rma n corp o ratio ns w ith a loss of Ge rman j obs. This analysis explo res
the issues facing th e German auto industry, and the matter of corp orate takeovers in
particular, while assessing the impac t of E. U . oversight o n the Ge rman auto industry and the
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German corporatist state. This assessment reveals inherent resistance by Germany and o ther
E . U. m ember states toward E. U. policies that facilitate corporate takeovers and describes a
number of corpo rate governance policies and government laws that continue to thwart
takeovers in the German auto industry. Tlus resistance has, fo r the tin'le being, effectively
derailed the current E.U . directive aimed at LlCilitating corporate takeovers.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GERMAN AUTO INDUSTRY

T he German autom o ti ve industry is the key industry in the G erman economy. " It is
o f ernin ent significan ce fo r growth and prosperity of Germany as a business locatio n . It is
indispensable . .. for guaranteeing a high level of incom e and fo r safeguarding a high
ernploym ent volume." (Becker, 217) M ore than a third of all vehicle production in the E. U.
is in Germany. T he G erman auto companies worldwide productio n am o unts to 23% of total
wo rld passenger car production and the German car brands possess a 47% market share in
Western E urope. Abo ut 20% of the annual German gross do m estic product in the last
decade was earned by the auto industry The auto industry produ ced a German foreign trade
surplus in cars of 79 billion euros in 2004, which am ounts to 80% of the entire Ge rman
trade surplus. The industry directl y employs approxim ately 770,000 Germans, with an
estimated 1.5 million m o re employed in the multitude of industries and services upstream
and downstream from autom otive production (e.g. m echalucal engineering, chenucals, etc.),
no t counting those in car sales and trades such as repair and service, etc, which add another
3 millio n jobs. It is estimated that o ne in seven Ge rman j obs depend on the auto industry.
T he German auto industry, understandabl y, has been referred to as the " engine of the
Ge rman Econom y." (B ecker, 21 8- 19)
THE IMPORTANCE OF CORPORATE-STATE RELATIONS IN THE GERMAN AUTO INDUSTRY

Ge rmany is a federal state m ade up of different states o r "lands." Many aspects of social
and econonuc life are decentralized in Germany and are the respo nsibility of these state
governments. The m aj o r German automotive corporations are Volkswagen, BMW,
DaimlerC hrysler, Porsche, O pel, and Ford Werke. Each m anufacturer has its headquarters in
a ditIerent state, with the exception of Porsche and D aimlerC hrysler, which share Stuttgart
in the state of Baden- Wti rttemberg as the site of their headquarters. The autom otive
companies that m ake up the Ge rman automotive industry have strong regional ties to the
German states in w hich they we re established and in which they maintain their
headquarters. Each of the German car companies, therefo re, must deal with its own regio nal
government, as well as the natio nal German government. Because of these strong regional
ties, each company can rely o n its own state govermnent to help represent its interests at the
natio nal level as w ell . (Dankbaa r, 2) The econonues of these states are centered on their m ain
indu stry, with each of these automakers typically being thc m aj or cmploycr, dircctly and
indirectly, in their respective regions. This is particularly true for Volkswagen, which
transformed Wolfsburg in the state of Lower Saxony into o ne of the largest auto productio n
sites in the world Volkswage n is the only major employer in the region (Dankbaar, 1), which
m akes the workforce in the state of Lower Saxony highly dependent on the company.
As in other German industries, the close associatio n of each German automobile
m anufacturer with its hom e state som etimes includes state ownership in the company,
altho ugh m ost often this is not the case. Substantial state ownerslup occurs in abo ut 10% of
German companies througho ut all sectors, as compared to 25% of French firms and 1% of
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u.K. firms, as of 1993. (Whittington and M ayer, 104) State ownership of firms in Germany,
w h en it occurs, is also m ore plural. "Reflecting Germany's federal nature, state share holdings
are found at va rious levels-federal, regional, ... and even municipal .... Among the regional
states, the most notable participatio n is probably Lower Saxony's in VW ... at abo ut 20%"
(Whittington and Mayer, 104-5) Even w hen there is no direct state ownership in a
particular company, the Ge rman government and the regional state governments in which
manufacturers are based take a corporatist, protective attitude toward the politically powelful
and irnportant German automobile companies.
The history of each of the m aj o r German autolllobile manufacturers, their
relationship to their regio nal states, as well as their place within the Ge rman auto industry
as a whole, provide case exa mples of the blending of corporate-state interests and of the
challenges facing the German auto industry and Germ an economy as a whole. This analysis
will fo cus on Volkswagen, Porsch e and DaimlerChrysler in particular.
VOLKSWAGEN

T he Gennan government fo unded Volkswagen (VW) as a state owned compan y in
1937. Volkswagen (meaning " people's car") was found ed with a social agenda. The o riginal
purpose of the company was to increase employment by employ ing the vast number of
workers needed to produce an affordable car on a grand scale. Ferdinand Porsche designed
the o riginal Volkswagen car, the famo us Beetle, at Adolf Hitler's request. The Beetle was
designed to become the Ge rman M odel T. At that time, an ave rage American worker could
afford a car, thanks to the economies of scale introdu ced by Ford and Ge neral M otors. In
contrast, the average Ge rman wo rker in 1937 could not afio rd a car. VW has continu ed to
follow the business model of a volume, mass-market producer, but has evolved from a single
product company (the Beetle) to a volume manufacturer that offers a broad range of
products covering wide sections of the market. In the 1980s and 1990s, VW shifted further
in the direction of increasing the scope (product range) of its production through the
acquisition of the Spanish company, SEAT, and the Czech company, Skoda.VW has furth er
expanded into the prem.ium car m arket, primarily through its Audi subsidiary, but also with
the acquisition of ultra luxury name plates such as Bentley and Bugatti. (Dankbaar, 1) VW is,
therefore, increasingly trying to satisfy all things automotive to all segm ents of the m arket.
Volkswagen was priva tized in the early 1960s. T he descendents of Ferdinand Porsche,
indud.ing his grandson Ferd.inand Piech, own shares in Volkswagen, as well having control
of Porsche through its supervisory board. (Brecht and M aye r, 30; Dankbaar, 2) VW and
Po rsche have had many links th ro ugho ut the history of the two companies. Ferdinand Piech
was the chief executive ofVW from 1993 until 2002.Wh en VW was priva tized in the 1960s,
the German government passed a law aimed at recognizing and perpetuating the social
importance ofVulkswagen to its native state of Lower Saxony by establishing an institutio nal
corpo rate safety valve to prevent a foreign or hostile takeover that might otherwise result in
the loss of thousands of jobs in W olfsburg. This law allowed Lower Saxony to own a
controlling 20% stake in the company and prevented other share holders from acquiring
m ore than this 20% stake of voting shares . TIllS 1960 law (known as the "Volkswagen law")
preserved a state interest in VW that effectively prevented a hostile takeove r, until Ferdinand
Piech launched a bid by Porsch e to take a controlling interest in VW in September 2005.
T his takeover bid created a protracted power struggle w ith Porsche acting in apparent
defi ance of the VW law. The Po rsche takeover ofVW has just recently come to fruition , as

The Impact of EU Oversight on Corporate Governance in the German Auto Industry

36

JASON GORN

Pitzer College

of M arch 2007, and hinged on the likelihood that the E .U. court would strike down the
German Volkswagen law. The Porsche bid for VW highlighted the anti-takeover VW law.
Tlus law had already become a fo cus of conflict between Germany and the E.U., since the
law is in apparent conflict with the E. U. directive o n corporate takeovers.3 This and other
conflicts between German automo bile industry interests and the E.U . w ill be discussed in
greater detail below, after considering the situ ation of other German autom obile
manufacturers as well , beginning with Porsche.
PORSCHE

Porsche is a niche automobile m anuEl cturer and is mu ch smaller than the other
German car compalues. H oweve r, Porsche is highl y profitable. In fac t, Po rsche produ ces the
highest profit margins o n its sales in th e entire glob al auto industry, even though all its cars
are produced in Ge rmany, with high German manufacturing costs. (Becker, 10) Fe rdinand
Porsche founded the cornpany in the 1930s and all the voting shares in the company are still
controlled by approximately 50 of his heirs (from the Porsche and Piech families). These
fanuly m embers retai n to tal control of the company through a sign ed voting pact and
corporate governance rules that all ow them control despite the fac t that their 100%
ownership of Porsche's voting shares represents only abo ut 10% of the company's capital. It
is estimated that the Porsche heirs toge ther own an additional 10% of non-voting stock as
well. (Brecht and M ayer, 30) T lus fanul y control of Po rsche precludes the possibility of
hostile takeovers, w ith the Porsch e and Piech families firml y in control of the company's
supervisory board and its destiny. Porsche's business plan, at least until recently, has b een to
remain a niche player in the auto market; but it is not a sm all company. Porsche has
approximately 8,000 employees and had total earnings in the year 2005-2006 of 2.1 1 billion
Euros, despite sales of just 96,794 cars, wluch nevertheless represented a sales volume
record .4
Although Porsche is based in Stuttgart, in the state of Baden-Wi.irttemburg, Porsche
has lo ngstanding close ties to vw, which has particularly helped Porsche over the years .
Porsche used VW parts in its first cars. Most recently, Po rsche was able to develop its luxury
SUV, the Cayenne, w ith o nly a m odest investment because of a partnership that it formed
with VW to share the platfonn used for the VW To uareg. This agreem ent helped Porsche
expand beyond its limited sports car line and reap high profits from a vehicle that it could
not have profitably developed on its own. s Po rsche, therefore, h as much to gain by
increasing its access to VW model platfo rms and electrorucs, which are costly to develop.
The operant Porsche business plan of remaining a boutique auto m aker and out-sourcing
much of its produ ct development and productio n has been exposed as unsustainable by
Po rsche managem ent's desire to forge closer ties with vw. Analysts h ave said that Porsch e's
VW takeove r bid stemmed from the fear of a possible link- up between VW and
DaimlerChrysler that would have j eopardized Porsche's historic partnership with VW. 6

BMW
BMW (Bava rian Motor Works) is another regional automotive powerhouse. BMW
was founded in 1916 in Munich , Bavaria. The corporate practices at BMW emulate the
traditional, somewhat isolationist values of Bavaria, as demonstrated by BMW's rather closed
corporate culture. (Dankbaar, 1) The Quandt fanlily controls BMW, as well as several o ther
majo r companies . BMW's business 1110del has traditio nally fo cused o n the prenuu111 o r high-
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end market as a specialist producer rather than a volume producer. More recently, however,
BMW has hedged its bets with a limited expansion into the nuss-market segment with the
Mini Cooper car and the lower end BMW 1 series. BMW has also pursued an extension of
its high-end market into the ultra luxury field with the acquisition of the Rolls-Royce
brand.
OPEL AND FORD WERKE

Opel and Ford Werke are Am erican owned subsidiaries of General Motors and Ford ,
respecti vely. T hese Gennan subsidiaries of the two big America n auto companies
nevertheless hold a significa nt place in the German auto industry. Opel is headquartered in
Frankfi.Irt in the regio n of H essen. Ford's European headquarters and production facilities
are in Koln in Northrhine- Westfal.ia. Opel is an old German company dating from the
1860s that was bought by General Moto rs in 1929. Europeans consider Opel a German car
and the region Jnd its workers generally look upon Opel as a GermJn company.
Nevertheless, Opel is controlled from the American headquarters of General M o tors. Ford
founded Ford Werke in 1925 and it is perhaps even more tightl y associated wi th its
American founder. H owever, Ford Werke still represents a m aj or employer in Koln.
(Dankbaar, 2) These companies are mass-market producers that have been criticized as too
focus ed o n the American emphasis on productivity and cost cutting rather than the typical
German automobile manufacturer's focus o n engineering, product innovatio n and quality.
The reputation of the German auto industry for engineering has often allowed German
manufacturers to obtain a premium for their cars that h as historically helped them to
overcome the disadvantage of high cost production in Germany. The different bu siness
cultures at Opel and Ford, as compared with the other Ge rman manufacturers, is refl ected
in. less innovative product lines and a lower consumer image that has required Opel and Ford
Werke to compete more o n price against the other European mass market manufacturers,
and has resulted in lower profit margins or losses. A comparison b etween the net returns on
2004 sales between Opel, which had a net loss on sales of minus 4%, and the world auto
industry leading net sales returns of Porsch e at plus 17%, illustrates the potential difference
in added value afforded by image, although these two m anufacturers occupy very different
market niches. (Becker, 4 and 10)
DAIMLERCHRYSLER AND EXPANDING SCOPE AND COMPETITION IN THE AUTO INDUSTRY

DaimlerChrysler was created in 1998 as the result of a merger between the German
company Daimler-Benz, which produces the Mercedes-Benz luxury brand, and the U.s.
mass-m arket manufacturer, C hrysler, with the German m anagers in control of the new
compan y. The German corporate culture of DaimlerC hrysler reflects the relative social and
political conservatism of its home state of Baden-Wi.irttemburg, w here its headquarter city
of Stuttgart is located. (Dankbaar, 1) The m erger with C hrysler reflected an extension of
Daimler-Benz down m arket that had already been started with the development of its Smart
Car subsidiary in the late 1990s and the expansion of the Mercedes-Benz line to include
the relatively inexpensive Mercedes A-class.
This product expansion reflects the competitive picture in the German auto industry
in which the high-end manufacturers, such as Mercedes-Benz and BMW, try to poach sales
and generate growth in the middle and lower segments of the nurket at the expense of the
historic mass-market producers. At the sam e time, as we have noted , VW and other mass
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producers try to m ove into the high end of the m arket for growth and higher profit m argins .
D aim..lerChrysler has also followed BMW's and VW's expansio ns into the ultra-luxury
m arket. BMW and VW acquired the Rolls R oyce and Bentley brands, respectively.
D aimlerC hrysler respo nded by developing its own new M aybach ultra- luxury brand . This
situatio n of ever expanding m odel ranges is occurring world w ide in an auto industry
replete with over capacity and stagnant real growth.
T he effo rts of relative niche pbyers like M erecedes-Benz and B MW to extend their
m arket into the lower range, and the effo rts of the mass-producers, such as VW, to expand
into the upper m arket segm ent, ha ve not addressed the industry's problem of over capacity.
Instead, each m anu fac turer that has followed this ro ute fa ces the increased cost of
m aintaining greater m odel diversity with lower than planned profit margins resulting from
a glut of new m odels across all m arket segm ents that has led to increased price competition
in each price range. Becker h as referred to this situatio n as an "oligopolistic destru ctive
competitio n. As the m arket as a w hole is no lo nger growing, every producer is trying to
generate growth at the cost of the other competitors .. ..the result in the end is that no ne
can be the lucky w inner; to a greater or lesser degree they are all losers w ith stagnant market
volumes and shrinking profit margins." (B ecker, 11 ) Maynard and B unkley qu oted a veteran
auto industry aml yst, j ohn A. Casesa , in the N cUJ Y(,,·k T imcs as saying that, "This industry is
ripe fo r further consolida tion beca use the m ost profitable markets have m atured; they 're not
growing anym o re. T hese are classic conditions fo r consolidation ."7
THE RISKS OF MERGING WITH A NON-GERMAN PARTNER

Although consolidation can clea rly b e a m ethod to redu ce overcapacity in the auto
industry, this was not Daimler- Benz's intent when they m erged w ith C hrysler in 1998 .
Instead, they sought market expansio n and a possible increase in effi ciency thro ugh
econo mies of scale. H owever, Daintier inherited an aging and relati vely weak product line
in the acquired C hrysler brands and was faced with the investment and engineering
ch allenge of coming up with competitive models for the four Chrysler brands, one of which
they eliminated (Plym o uth) . The Daimler-Benz strategy of acquiring an expanded world
lnarket share through its m erger with C hrysler is now seen as an apparent failure.
Furtherm ore, the m erger that resulted in D aimlerC hrysler led to a relatively wide
distributio n of corporate ownership, as compared to the narrow distribution of own ership
and control typical of German companies, particularly in the Ge rman auto industry
(excluding the American controlled companies of Opel and Fo rd). The D aintlerB e nz/ C hrysler m erger resulted in Americans holding 10% of the shares in the resulting
DaimlerC hrysler Corpo ration. (Dankbaar, 1) T his brings into play an American shareholder
expectation of m aximizing sh are valu e.
SHAREHOLDERS VS. STAKEHOLDERS

American shareholder interest in maximizing share price over the sho rt term is at
odds with the traditio nal German m entality of shareholders as company stakeh olders.
German company shareholders and vo ting blocks are not w idely distributed among
financial and other private institutio ns, mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies,
and individuals, as compared to the broad distribution of company stocks held by these
fa ctions in America (o r in the u.K.). (Becht and M ayer, 29) Instead , German board and
sh areholder voting blocks are m o re tightly held and include trade unio ns and banks with a
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stake in the company, in addition to the holdings of founding families, other German
companies, and, in some cases, the state. These German shareholders have a long-term stake
in the companies that they hold and are typically categorized as risk adverse, interested in
the long-term stability of the corporation, and are concerned with the social implications
of risky organizational change. (Luo. 38)
THE RISKS Of SHAREHOLDERS: THE DAIMLERCHRVSLER EXAMPLE

The German auto companies have only Illediocre market capitalization levels,
especially in comparison with Toyota, the world's most valuable carmaker with a market
capitalization of 239 billion dollars.S This reflects the fact that, overall, Germany lacks a
shareholder culture, with a market capitalization of only 30% of its GDp, compared to 122%
in the U.S. and 152% in the u.K. Typically, individuals and institutional investors own few
shares of German public corporations. (Luo, 42) If the present major stakeholders in the
German auto companies lose control over their tightly held shares and limited voting
blocks, "Acquisitions by outsiders could put Germany's automobile industry in the same
position as Britain's. where every notable name has been sold to foreign owners."9
The vulnerability of DaimlerChrysler to such a takeover is perceived as having
increased as the result of its swallowing of Chrysler and the resulting depreciation and
dilution of its stock. This caIne to a head in February 2007 when the Chrysler division of
DaiInlerChysler reported that it had lost 1.48 billion dollars . Dieter Zetsche ,
D<\imlerChrysler's chief executive, announced that "all options are on the table" in regard to
a sale of the Chrysler division. 10 Zetsche has cited his desire to n1.aintain control of the
German parent company, Daintier, as his reason for proposing to divest Daintier of the
Chrysler division by seeking suitors for Chrysler. 11 Since this announcement,
DaimlerChrysler has had negotiations with a number of potential suitors for Chrysler,
including private equity firms who "would most likely impose plant closings and layoffs to
turn around Chrysler for a quick resale." 12 This potential " doomsday" scenario for Chrysler,
in which it is bought by a private equity firm and cannibalized to turn a quick profit,
represents a prescient warning for German Daintier itself. Adam Jonas, an analyst of the
European auto industry for Morgan Stanley in London, was quoted in the NeU' York Times
as saying, "Should the sale [of Chrysler] fail to take place, DaimlerChrysler shares will
probably fall once more, leaving the company even more vulnerable. If Zetsche doesn't get
this right ... the door will be open to interlopers." 13
BACK TO THE FUTURE fOR DAIMLER?

After the potential sale of Chrysler, DaimlerChrysler shareholders have advoca ted a
return to the "old days," with the resurrection of the D aimler-Benz name and a renewed
emphasis on the Mercedes luxury brand 14 Presumably, this restructuring would allow a
return to the previous concentration of shareholders who hold a stake in the company and
a typical German corporate concentration of voting blocks that could fend off hostile
takeovers in the future. Tllis potential effort by DaimlerChrysler to divest itself of its
American corporate division is an effort to reassert its German roots and return to the
typical protectionist German corporate influences of the past.
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DAIMLER-BENZ: THE ROLE OF BANKS IN GERMAN CORPORATIONS

Prior to its merger with Chrysler, Daimler-Benz represented a classic example of
German corporate structure. Corporate government at the former Daimler-Benz, like most
Gennan corporations, was "characterized by a lesser reliance on capital markets and outside
investo rs and a stronger reliance on large inside investors and finan cial institutions to achieve
efilciency..." (Luo, 42) Instead of m arket and outside investors, Germans firms receive strong
investment from banks tlut are influential in the design and fun ctioning of the companies
them selves. This is a result of the tact that the banks themselves sit on the boards and
commissions of the companies. Ernst-Jiirgen Horn , in his evaluation of industrial policy in
M'I/laging Illdustrial Change in J,#stcrn Europe, reports that the "banking system is said to have
an extraordinarily intimate relationship with the big industrial groups .... Excessive
economic power. ... allows the banks to act as brokers, investlnent analysts, dealers and much
else besides." (55) Horn then goes on to list three major factors in bank control: "(i)
Participation of banks in non bank corporations. (ii) The Depotstimmrecht, that is the
proxy votes by banks on behalf of shares deposited with them by clients. (iii) The
representation of banks on the supervisory boards of non bank operations." (55). Horn sites
statistics that show how imbedded banks are in firms. For example, in the annual meeting
of sixteen corporations, the bank-owned shares came to over 25 percent of shares
represented in corporations. Banks also control proxy votes and represented through proxies
over 25 percent of the votes in 41 corporations, and over 50 percent in thirty. This means
that through proxies alone, not including bank owned shares, banks could vote on 10
percent of the shares in fifty cases, going as high as 25 percent in twenty-nine cases. (56)
In "Anatomy of a Governance Transformation: The Case of Daimler-Benz," Denis
Logue and James K. Seward reported that in the late 1980's banks were the top 5
shareholders in the Daimler-Benz company, controlling 78.39 percent of the voting stock.
(90) The structure of Daimler-Benz was a prime example of the typical German
corporation. Deutsche Bank in particular has had deep and historic ties to Daimler-Benz,
with links to both of its parent companies, Daintier and Benz. Deutsche Bank was heavily
involved in the m erger of these two firms in 1926 and supplied the chairmanship of the
newly merged company over its first decade. (Whittington and Myer, 97) Deutsche Bank's
investment in Daimler-Benz in 1993 consisted of roughly 28 percent of the company's
stock . As Logue and Seward explain, Deutsche Bank exerted incredible power in managing
the company. Tllis has to do with the typical German corporate structure of the company.
"Large German companies have two governing boards: the supervisory board and the
management board. The supervisory board is composed of directors and representatives of
various labor groups; including 'white collar' employees ... The supervisory board of
Daimler-Benz has twenty members. The chairman of Daimler-Benz's supervisory board,
Hilmar Kopper, also happens to be the chairman of Deutsch e Bank's management board."
(Logue and Seward, 90) The supervisory board's task is to appoint the management board
and to approve major corporate decisions. Much of this is left up to banks.
As Logue and Seward also point o ut, "This bank dominance effectively means that
under the traditional system of corporate governance in Germany, external capital markets
exert little discipline." (91) The proponents of this German system of stakeholder corporate
governance, as opposed to shareholder corporate culture, argue that large shareholders like
the banks share strategic motivations wi th the operational managers to advance the
company's business rather than a motivation to merely maxinlize the value of a company's

https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2007/iss1/5

Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union

41

shares. According to Sigurt Vitols, "Large German banks have tended to view their
shareholdings as a mechanism for protecting their loans and strengthening their business
relationships with companies rather than as a direct source of income." (Vitols, 342) Horn
concludes, " It is hard to assess how far the close relationship between the banks and the big
corporJtions contributes to overall industrial performance. It has been argued that the banks
are well equipped to provide strategic advice and that, wanting good returns, they are vitally
concerned with the efficiency of their clients." (56).
THE PRESSURES OF GLOBALIZATION ON GERMAN CORPORATE STRUCTURE

The argument agJinst the German stake holding system fits into the general views on
globalization, which are increasingly being promoted by the European Union. The E.u.
seeks to promote actions that are in the interest of international competitiveness (as opposed
to the potentially more myopic interests of corporate stakeholders) and in the interest of
developing a single capital market. The E. U. policies, therefore, tend to encour;]ge corporate
restructuring in "stakeholder countries" such as Germany. These policies are designed to
Clcilitate takeover bids when such bids are in the interests of a company's general
shareholders, as opposed to the interests of only its stakeholders. This E. U. policy ofhreaking
down the protectionist barriers to takeovers has been contentious, as can be seen in the close
votes in the European Parliament on provisions in the E.U. law (directive) concerning
takeovers. For example, in July 2001 , 273 representatives voted for and 273 voted against a
proposed directive text, which defea ted that effort. IS To a large degree, the E.u. efiorts have
been "incremental- rather than fundamental " in advancing changes in ownership, employee
representation, and management institutions. (Vitols, 339) Proponents of these changes
argue that, "since international capital markets are increasingly dominated by diversified
portfolio investors (such as mutual funds and pension fund s) seeking higher returns,
c~mpanies must adopt the shareholder model or be starved of the external capital needed
to invest and survive." (Vitols, 338) According to this argument, obtaining access to capital
markets will ultimately drive corporations away from the non-market driven features of the
stakeholder model in order to achieve greater competitiveness.
The DaimlerChrysler merger took Daimler-Benz at least incrementally in the
direction of market forces and incrementally away from its stakeholder foundations.
DaimlerChrysler was incorporated under German law as a German stock corporation (A G)
and retains a two-tiered German system of corporate governance with a supervisory board
of major shareholder and employee representatives and a separate management board, all in
keeping with the German stakeholder system. However, shares of DaimlerChrysler are
widely held and company shares are traded on both the NYSE and the FrJnkfurt Stock
Exchange, and at other locations around the world, with the necessary transparency in
financial reporting. Americans are estimated to hold 10% or more of the stock. (Dankbaar,1)
Although Deutsche Bank remains the largest single shareholder, the bank's holding were
diluted from 28% to 12% by the merger. (Whittington and Mayer, 97) When the going
recently got rough, with Chrysler division losing 1.48 billion dollars and the world
automotive industry ripe for further consolidation, even this incremental move by Daintier
toward market/ shareholder forc es, and the resulting dilution of the stakeholder system at
Daintier, has been enough for DaimlerChrysler CEO Dieter Zetsche to adapt a cut and run
policy toward Chrysler. By divesting the Chrysler division and the American shareholder
pressures that came along with the Chrysler acquisition, Zetsche hopes to avoid putting the
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core G erman company in play fo r a takeover, with a little help from stakeholder promoting
Ge nnan laws and German corpo rate governance institutio ns.
VW
DaimlerChrysler's takeover fears did not arise in a vacuum. D airnlerChrysler has been
the observer ofPorsche 's partially hostile takeover of the mu ch largerVW Corporati on over
the last 18 months. T his takeover raises still other concerns relating to co rporate
globalization-type reforms and E .U. policy, as well as potential conflict of interest concerns
relating to cross investment in Ge rman companies, even by competitors in the sam e
industry. It also points to a fl aw in the Ge rman system of concentrated corporate ownership
and control, which m ay allow an inside player to w restle control of a company if Ge rman
restraints against takeovers are relaxed. The Porsche takeover ofVW shows that, at least in
the sh o rt term , German firms m ay have to be m o re concerned abo ut takeovers from with.in
their b oarders than from o utside. The stereotypical xenophobic nature of the Ge rman
psyche nuy care less ab o ut this threa t, but su ch inside takeovers are not necessarily in the
general sh areholders interest, o r even in the interest of a particular corporation such as VW.
Although Porsch e has histo ric engineering and product ties to Vw, these ties have
seem.in gly benefited the sm aller Po rsche Company to a greater degree. It is unlikely that
Po rsch e would have been able to m anufacture automobiles witho ut access to VW parts from
its very b eginning. As auto m akers look to expand the scope of their lines into new m odels
in o rder to compete, the sm all European niche players other than Po rsche have all been
absorbed by larger firms. T he writing is on the wall, even tho ugh Porsche remains highl y
profitable in the present. As we have seen , Porsche's present profitabilit y was aided by the
highl y advantageous deal that Porsche was able to make w ith VW to give it access to the
To uareg SUV platform fo r its Cayenne version luxury SUVThis platform was developed at
a to tal estimated cost of 1.2 to 1.8 billion dollars. Porsche invested only 420 million dollars,
w hich is "very, very little fo r a n ew car," according to Ferdinand Dudenhoffer, directo r of
the German C enter for Autom o tive Research at the University of Gelsenkirchen. "There is
no question, VW had all the risks and Porsche earned the greatest profits," according to
Dudenhoffer. 16 VW also does m ost of the m anufacturing of the C ayenne for Porsche at its
factory in Bratislava, were the cost of m.anufacturing is lower than at existing Porsche plants
in Germany. If Porsche's interests are allowed to dictate future developments, VW's own
brands may suffer in Po rsche's interest, as the wide range of brands and models that VW
owns nuy potentially, if no t alread y, compete with Porsche, particularly Audi. This conflict
has, in fac t, already been dem onstrated in the Cayenne/ Touareg deal.This deal went through
well b efore the present Po rsch e takeover effort, but it still likely reflects the strong position
of Piech and other Po rsch e representatives on the VW advisory board, even before the
takeove r. Audi insiders complain that the VW I Porsche cooperation on the Cayenne delayed
the introduction of the Audi Q7 luxury SUV by 3 years. Tlus car has only just recently com e
to m arket, well after the Cayenne, likely costing Audi m arket share and profit. Other VW
brands besides Audi m ay also stand in the way of Po rsche's current or potential m arket
nich e, particularly Bugatti and Lambo rgini . Will the fate of these brands be deternuned by
VW's b est interest or in the best interest ofPorsche?17
TAKEOVER FROM THE INSIDE: PORSCHE AND

CROSS OWNERSHIP OF CORPORATE SHARES: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

These m arket concerns are no t simply details of the Ge rman auto market; they arise
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from a potential conflict of interest inherent in the German corporate governance structure
that allows cross ownership in a competitor's company. This conflict of interest is potentially
magnified by the concentrated ownership of controlling shares in German companies and
it is spotlighted by Porsche's bid for VW In the case ofVW, the VW law served to counter
the possibility that the owner of another company in the sa m e industry could amass a
controlling stake that would allow him to influence management to act against the interests
of the company, and therefore against the interest of Lower Saxony. Tllis law guaranteed
Lower Saxo ny the single largest voting block of shares, which no other single owner could
exceed. Even so, Ferdinand Piech, who with his family controls 100% of the voting shares
of Porsche, was likely able to influence VW in the interests of Porsche even before he
attempted his takeover ofVW. Piech's pre-existing power on the VW supervisory board
certainl y helped llim to launch and pull off Porsche's takeover ofVW from the inside.
In the future, globalization and an accompanying shareholder culture may apply
pressure for reforms to the German corporate culture that allows for co ncentrated cross
ownership of stock in a competitor, such as the shares and influence exercised by Po rsche
in VW Such influence is potentially counter to the interests of a free market and to the
interests of company's general shareholders if the competitor gains undue influence in the
company, as may have happened in the case ofPorsche and its influence on vw. Even before
the Porsche/ VW takeover bid there had already been some pressure to change the German
corporate practice of allowing a retired former CEO to ass ume the company 's board
chairmanship, where he may appoint his successor and maintain undue influence. (Luo, 43)
This practice was still in place at VW and it is one of the German corporate pra ctices that
Piech exploited in his takeover ofVW. Piech holds the strong position of C hairman ofVW's
supervisory board because he was the recently retired CEO ofVW Piech 's power was also
magnified because he already controlled a large number of voting shares through the
holdings of Porsche and his family in VW Porsche AG already held two seats on the VW
supervisory board, in addition to Piech's own seat, even before the takeover attempt was
launched. At the start of the Porsche and Piech takeover bid, " Investors, analysts, and
members of the VW supervisory board [cried] foul over Piech's conflict of interest, since he
juggles ownership in Porsche with his role as VW chairman." 18
Coup: HEADS ROLL
Christian Wulff, the premier of Lower Saxony who sits on the VW board representing
the state of Lower Saxony, initially attempted to block Piech 's takeover by proposing that
both Piech and the other Porsche managers who sit on the VW board be removed. He
supported this proposal by citing the German corporate governance code that reconunends
(hut does not demand) that a chairman step down if he holds a position with a conl.petitor.
19 This did not happen . The CEO ofVw, Bernd Pischetsrieder, sided with Wulff. Piech and
his collaborators on the VW board removed Pischetsrieder in November 2006 .20 Piech
stayed on, increasing Porsche's shares in VW and demanding an additional Porsche seat on
the supervisory board. When Pischetsrieder was forced out as CEO, Volkswagen's No.2
executive, Wolfgang Bernhard, also resigned. Bernhard had been brought to VW from
Chrysler to pursue a stringent cost-cutting program at VW to help better position VW as a
competitive mass-market producer. With the removal of these two executives and the
appointment of Martin Winterkorn, a Piech protege, Piech consolidated his hold on VW
and reasserted VW's old priorities from his tenure as CEO at vw. Since these management
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changes,VW has shifted its emphasis from cost-cutting back to high-quality engineering and
design, in line with the market strategy advocated by Mr. Piech, who trained as an
automotive engineer. 21 Only the VW law could conceivably stand in the way of Piech's and
Porsche's takeover ofVW, a takeover which reassembles the parts of Piech's grandfather's
automotive legacy into one empire.
THE E.U.'s UPHILL BATTLE TO FACILITATE TAKEOVERS

Piech's takeover bid was always dependent on the E.U striking down the German VW
law. Piech had reason to believe that the E.U would comply with his wishes. The E.U
Parliament has long recognized that a directive on a common framework for cross-boarder
takeover bids is essential. Under increasing conditions of globalization, such transactions "can
contribute to the development and reorganization of European firms, a key condition for
withstanding international competition and developing a single capital market. That said,
[takeovers] are still subject to very divergent national rules [that] give rise to numerous
problems ... " (COM (2002) 534 final, page 3)
The contentiousness of this takeover issue can be seen in the E.Ulegislative history
involving the framing of a directive on takeover bids. The E.U. first began work on a
directive to approximate E .U member state's laws that govern takeover bids in 1985. By
1990, the E.U Commission had devised the text of a directive aimed at " harmonizing" the
field of takeover bids in Europe. This proposal encountered strong opposition from certain
member states and required revision. (COM (2002) 534 final, page, 2) By 1997, however,
the Commission adapted an amended proposal and by 2000 the Council unanimously
adopted this position. Controversies on certain issues persisted and amendments were
proposed. The tie vote in the European Parliament on a compromise text, mentioned above,
led to the defeat of the text in July 2001. This defeat centered on three controversial political
considerations that reflect Europe's ambivalence on takeovers. The first political
consideration was a rejection of the stipulation that the board of a company facing a
takeover must obtain approval from shareholders before it can take defensive measures
against a bid. The second political consideration was the perception that the E.U. takeover
directive provided insufficient protection to the employees of companies facing a takeover.
The third political concern was that the proposal still failed to achieve a level playing field
with the United States. (COM (2002) 534 final, page 2) Despite the existence of an E.U
law to facilitate takeovers, political divisions such as these have continued to hamstring the
E.U's efforts.
In 2002, the European Conunission proposed new rules to address outstanding
concerns on the takeover directive. This new revision contained articles that had specific
implications against the survival of the German VW law, or similar measures. Specifically,
Article 11 of these provisions stipulates that restrictions on the transfer of securities, such as
the imposition of a ceiling on shareholding or restrictions on voting rights, "are rendered
unenforceable against the ofieror or cease to have effect once a bid has been made public
(Article 11)." (COM (2002) 534 final, page 4) These provisions, and other provisions
designed to prevent both pre-bid and post-bid defenses to takeovers, were adapted in the
Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of21 April 2004 on
takeover bids. However, last minute negotiations at the time, resulting from strong resistance
on the part of several countries, including Germany, heavily watered down this E.U
takeover directive. These negotiations resulted in an amendment that allows countries to

https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2007/iss1/5

Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union

45

opt-out of certain key provisions of the directive. This amendment also exempts companies
from the rules if the bidder is not subj ect to the same obligations. 22 A recent review by the
Commission of the European Conm1Unities on the impl em entation of the Directive on
Takeover bids, released o n February 21,2007 , found that a majority of states exploited these
loopholes in a protectionist fashion , which m ay have resulted in new obstacles to takeovers.
(SEC(2007)268 , page 10) This report no tes that Gerlllany is one of many countries that
allow its companies to o pt o ut of the two key provisions in the takeover directive, including
the ilnpo rtant Article 11 (breakthrou gh rule) as well as Article 9 (the board neutrality rule).
(SEC(2007)268, page 12) For the time being, the German VW law remains on the books.
E.U. MOVES TO STRIKE DOWN THE VW LAW
Altho ugh many countri es, including Germany, exploited the loophole of optional
exemptions to block the E. U. directive o n takeovers, the E .U. nevertheless proceeded to take
legal action against countries that refused to apply the fundamental rules. The German
Volkswagen law soon cam e under scrutiny by the E uropean Commissio n, which
complained to Germany about the law in 2004 .23 The E. U. subsequentl y took Germany to
court over this law in 2005. Porsch e and Piech's takeover bid forVW has, therefore, assumed
that this law would b e struck down. A Porsche spokesman recentl y confirmed this
assumption when he claimed " that the E uropean Court of Justice would confirm the
invalidi ty of the VW law and so ca use the German goverrunent to change or abolish tlus
law."24 Porsche's assumptio n appears to have been correct. On February 13, 2007 , an
advocate general on the E uro pean Court of Justice, Damaso Rui z-Jarabo, reached a
preliminary ruling stating that the VW law unreasonably prevented any intervention in the
managem ent ofVW and was "not based o n overriding reasons relating to public interest."25
Although the advocate 's opinions are no t binding on E .U. judges, the court follow s these
opinions approximately 80% of the time. 26 Should the court ta il to strike dow n the VW law,
or should Ge rmany try to circumvent the authority of the court (perhaps through appeals
invoking the opt-out provisions of the directive), Porsche will " find itself holding a costly
stake in the company witho ut being able to exercise m o re than 20% of the voting shares."27
THE

VW: A FATE COMPUS
Since this anno uncem ent by the European Court advocate general , Porsche expanded
its h oldings in VW to 31% of the voting rights. T his acquisition exceeded the stipulated
greater than 30% holding required to trigger a mandatory bid for the entire company. This
stipulated m andatory bid for the entire company is the result of Article 5 of the E.U.
takeover directive that sought to protect nunority share holders and guara ntee them an
equitable price. However, tllis provisio n does not stipulate that the buyo ut offer be at a
buyout induced prenuu111 share price, o r even at current market valu e, o nly that the offer
be made at the stock's ave rage value over a period of at least 6 months, to be deternuned by
German law. (2004/25/EC: Article 5, section 4) Since Germany opted out of the directive
rule that would have obliged the VW board to hold a general meeting of shareholders to
vote to approve or block the bid, the general (non-voting) shareholders in VW have no
power over the bid price offer other than that stipulated by the German implementatio n of
Article 5 of the E . U. takeover directive. This meant that Porsche was able to make a below
market offer to buy the rel1l.aining shares in the company. Porsche and Piech's inside
influence allowed Porsche to gain control ofVW at a relative bargain price without paying
THE PORSCHE TAKEOVER OF
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shareholders the typical premium that a takeover entails. M ajor VW shareholders are
reportedly distressed at this result. 28 Since Porsche now already controls the company with
31 % of the voting shares, it does not need the remaining company shares, most of which
exert no influence on how the company is run. Porsche's below market bid for these shares
is only a formality. Porsche is not likely to have to buy any shares at the offered price, whi ch
is well below the current market-trading price. This is fin e with Porsche, which does not
plan to further increase its shares, according to a Porsche spokesman. 29 Porsche and Piech,
therefore, gained control ofVW "on the cheap," and the E. U. takeover directive stipulation
(Article 5) designed to protect the share price for minority shareholders was inefiective in
this case.
Politically, Porsche has had to convince the Germans that it is a stable partner acting
in the interests ofVW and of Germany, emphasizing that Porsche is not an outside (foreign)
interloper. Porsche and Piech's public relations program in tlus vein seeks to paint Porsche
as the savior ofVW, with Porsche acting to protect VW from the consequences of the E. U.
court's impending decision to strike-down the VW law. Porsche's campaign insinuates that
if Porsche does not gain control oNW, the elinunation of the VW law will result Volkswagen
being acquired by an outside buyer who would insist on American style restructuring with
the loss of thousands of jobs. Adam Jonas, the auto industry analyst at Morgan Stanley in
London, interprets Porsche executives as saying, "Trust us, we're not trying to Hip this thing
for value. This is a hundred year investment. Leave it with us, and we'll watch out for it."30
CONCLUSION

The German fear of takeovers in its auto industry is understandable given the vital
importance of the auto industry to the German economy. The example of the British auto
industry, in w luch every significant British-owned manufacturer succumbed to foreign
takeover, is certainly prescient to the German auto industry and Governmant. The English
car brands were often bought strictly for their marketing cach e, to be resurrected in another
country without any British ties or contribution to the British economy, as exemplified by
a Chinese lTlanufacturer who now manufactures a Chinese sports car under the MG
nameplate. Germany is not alone in its resistance to lift barriers to takeovers. The E.U.'s own
recent conmllssion report (SE(2007)268) concluded that a large number of countries have
failed to act to lift barriers against corporate takeovers through laws that would change
protectionist corporate governance policies, as stipulated by the E.U. directive on corporate
takeovers. Instead, there has been a strong trend for corporations and countries to use
loopholes in the E.U takeover directive to find acceptable ways to block takeovers instead
of facilitating them. This threatens to convert the existing E.U directive into a directive on
allowed protectiOlust practices.
Striking down the VW law only removes one solitary law among the numerous
institutionalized German corporate protections. Ironically, the Germ.an VW law had already
outlived its usefulness. The law stood in the way of market forces that pushed two German
companies to effectively consolidJte into one holding. This consolidation of VW and
Porsche serves the needs ofPorsche, one of the most profitable German auto manufacturers,
and may perpetuate German ownership ofVW in the long haui. However, the E. 0. system
of creating a single free market by directive, including facilitation of corporate takeovers, has
been exposed as weak. Although German stakeholder corporate governance and GermJn
corporatist state policies and regulations are at odds with the market integration efforts by
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the E.U, German corporatist policies will not go away as long as they are useful and are
perceived as strengthening German commerce. If market forces subsequently prove that
these policies are detrimental to German corporate and state interests, as globalists predict,
then the Germans will change these policies. If market forces do not prove German
stakeholder protectionist policies to be detrimental, particularly given their longstanding
proven stability benefits, then these policies will persist.
The E.U. must let the market dictate, as E. U. directives will not dictate the market.
The European Commission, in its report on the implementation of the Directive on
Takeover Bids (SE(2007)268) has concluded as much when it announced that the E . U will
take no immediate efforts to rewrite the directive to achieve better implementation of its
objectives. Instead, the Commission plans to take "into account the potential negative effects
of the new takeover rules on the European market. ... and try to analyze the reasons why
Member States are so reluctant to endorse the fundamental rules of the Directive."
(SE(2007)268) In other words, the COlnmission will continue to observe German (and
other European) corporate systems, including the German auto industry, but it will 'leave
welJ enough alone,' at least for now.
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